Hungarian Revolution of 1956

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Template:Infobox Military Conflict The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (Template:Lang-hu) was a spontaneous nationwide revolt against the Stalinist government of Hungary and its Soviet-imposed policies, lasting from 23 October until 10 November 1956.<ref>Alternate references are "Hungarian Revolt" and "Hungarian Uprising"; "Revolution" is used as it conforms to both English (see U.S. Department of State background on Hungary) and Hungarian ("forradalom") conventions. There is a distinction between the "complete overthrow" of a revolution and an uprising or revolt that may or may not be successful (Oxford English Dictionary). The 1956 Hungarian event, although shortlived, is a true "revolution" in that the sitting Government was indeed deposed. Unlike "coup d'etat" or "putsch" which imply action of a few, the 1956 revolution was effected by the masses.</ref>

The revolt began as a student demonstration which attracted thousands as it marched through central Budapest to the Parliament building. A student delegation entering the radio building in an attempt to broadcast its demands was detained. When the delegation's release was demanded by the demonstrators outside, they were fired upon by the State Security Police (ÁVH) from within the building. The news spread quickly and disorder and violence erupted throughout the capital.

The revolt spread quickly across Hungary, and the government fell. Thousands organized into militias, battling the State Security Police (ÁVH) and Soviet troops. Pro-Soviet communists and ÁVH members were often executed or imprisoned, as former prisoners were released and armed. Impromptu councils wrested municipal control from the ruling Hungarian Working People's Party, and demanded political changes. The new government formally disbanded the ÁVH, declared its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and pledged to re-establish free elections. By the end of October, fighting had almost stopped and a sense of normality began to return.

After announcing a willingness to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet forces, the Politburo changed its mind and moved to crush the revolution. On 4 November, a large Soviet force invaded Budapest and other regions of the country. Hungarian resistance continued until 10 November. Over 2,500 Hungarians and 700 Soviet troops were killed in the conflict, and 200,000 Hungarians fled as refugees. Mass arrests and denunciations continued for months thereafter. By January 1957, the new Soviet-installed government had suppressed all public opposition. These Soviet actions alienated many Western Marxists, yet strengthened Soviet control over Central Europe, cultivating the perception that communism was both irreversible and monolithic.

Public discussion about this revolution was suppressed in Hungary for over 30 years, but since the thaw of the 1980s it has been a subject of intense study and debate. At the inauguration of the Third Hungarian Republic in 1989, 23 October was declared a national holiday.

Contents 1 Prelude 1.1 Postwar occupation 1.2 Political repression and economic decline 1.3 International events 1.4 Social unrest builds 2 Revolution 2.1 First shots 2.2 Fighting spreads, government falls 2.3 Interlude 2.3.1 The New Hungarian National Government 2.3.2 Soviet perspective 2.3.3 International reaction 2.4 Soviet intervention of 4 November 2.5 Soviet version of the events 3 Aftermath 3.1 Hungary 3.2 International 3.3 Commemoration 4 See also 5 References 6 Further reading 7 External links

Prelude

After World War II, the Soviet military occupied Hungary and gradually replaced the freely elected government with the Hungarian Communist Party.<ref name="UNPara47">"By 1948, leaders of the non-Communist parties had been silenced, had fled abroad or had been arrested, and, in 1949, Hungary officially became a People’s Democracy. Real power was in the hands of Mátyás Rákosi, a Communist trained in Moscow. Under his régime, Hungary was modelled more and more closely on the Soviet pattern. Free speech and individual liberty ceased to exist. Arbitrary imprisonment became common and purges were undertaken, both within and outside the ranks of the Party. In June, 1949, the Foreign Minister, László Rajk, was arrested; he was charged with attempting to overthrow the democratic order and hanged. Many other people were the victims of similar action.(1) This was made easier by the apparatus of the State security police or ÁVH, using methods of terror in the hands of the régime, which became identified with Rákosi’s régime in the minds of the people." UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Radical nationalization of the economy based on the Soviet model produced economic stagnation, lower standards of living and a deep malaise.<ref name="LibCongressHungaryEconomy">Library of Congress: Country Studies: Hungary, Chapter 3 Economic Policy and Performance, 1945–85 Retrieved 27 August 2006</ref> Writers and journalists were the first to voice open criticism, publishing critical articles in 1955.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> By 22 October 1956, Technical University students had resurrected the banned MEFESZ student union,<ref name="Crampton295">Crampton, R. J. (2003). Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century–and After, p. 295. Routledge: London. ISBN 0-415-16422-2.</ref> and staged a demonstration on 23 October which set off a chain of events leading directly to the revolution.

Postwar occupation

After World War II, Hungary fell under the Soviet sphere of influence and was occupied by the Red Army.<ref>The Library of Congress: Country Studies; CIA World Factbook Retrieved 13 October 2006</ref> By 1949, the Soviets had concluded a mutual assistance treaty with Hungary which granted the Soviet Union rights to a continued military presence, assuring ultimate political control.<ref> In 1949 the ruling communist parties of the founding states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were also linked internationally through the Cominform Library of Congress Country Studies Appendix B -- Germany (East)</ref>

Hungary began the postwar period as a multiparty free democracy, and elections in 1945 produced a coalition government under Prime Minister Zoltán Tildy.<ref>Norton, Donald H. (2002). Essentials of European History: 1935 to the Present, p. 47. REA: Piscataway, New Jersey. ISBN 0-87891-711-X.</ref> However, the Soviet-supported Hungarian Communist Party, which had received only 17% of the vote, constantly wrested small concessions in a process named "salami tactics", which sliced away the elected government's influence.<ref>Template:Cite book Retrieved 8 October 2006</ref>

In 1945, Soviet Marshal Kliment Voroshilov forced the freely elected Hungarian government to yield the Interior Ministry to a nominee of the Hungarian Communist Party. Communist Interior Minister László Rajk established the Hungarian State Security Police (Államvédelmi Hatóság, later known as the ÁVH), which employed methods of intimidation, false accusations, imprisonment and torture, to suppress political opposition.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> The brief period of multiparty democracy came to an end when the Hungarian Communist Party merged with the Social Democratic Party to become the Hungarian Working People's Party, which stood its candidate list unopposed in 1949. The People's Republic of Hungary was declared.<ref name="UNPara47"/>

Political repression and economic decline

Hungary became a communist state under the severely authoritarian leadership of Mátyás Rákosi.<ref>Video: Hungary in Flames {{[1] producer: CBS (1958) - Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306-0-1:40}}</ref> The Security Police (ÁVH) began a series of purges of more than 7000 dissidents were denounced as "Titoists" or "western agents", and forced to confess in show trials, after which they were relocated to a camp in eastern Hungary.<ref name="Tokes317">Tőkés, Rudolf L. (1998). Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession, p. 317. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. ISBN 0-521-57850-7</ref><ref name=wilson>Template:Cite book</ref>

From 1950 to 1952, the Security Police forcibly relocated thousands of people to obtain property and housing for the Working People's Party members, and to remove the threat of the intellectual and 'bourgois' class. Thousands were arrested, tortured, tried, and imprisoned in concentration camps, deported to the east, or were executed, including ÁVH founder László Rajk.<ref name="Tokes317"/><ref name=lawsoc>Template:Cite book (page 49). Gati describes "the most gruesome forms of psychological and physical torture...The reign of terror (by the Rákosi government) turned out to be harsher and more extensive than it was in any of the other Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe." He further references a report prepared after the collapse of communism, the Fact Finding Commission Torvenytelen szocializmus (Lawless Socialism): "Between 1950 and early 1953, the courts dealt with 650,000 cases (of political crimes), of whom 387,000 or 4 percent of the population were found guilty. (Budapest, Zrinyi Kiado/Uj Magyarorszag, 1991, 154).</ref> In a single year, more than 26,000 people were forcibly relocated from Budapest. As a consequence, jobs and housing were very difficult to obtain. The deportees generally experienced terrible living conditions and were impressed as slave labor on collective farms. Many died as a result of the poor living conditions and malnutrition.<ref name=wilson />

The Rákosi government thoroughly politicized Hungary's educational system in order to supplant the educated classes with a "toiling intelligentsia".<ref>In February 1950, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's Party defined the supplantation of bourgeois leaders as its main goal. József Darvas, the Minister of Education and Religion from February 1950, wrote about secondary educational reforms in the pedagogical magazine Köznevelés (17 September 1950): "The conversion of different grammar schools to industrial technical institutes, agricultural technical institutes, economical vocational high schools and training-colleges for school teachers and kindergarten instructors tends to the success of the five year plan by supplying many of the needed technicians." On 30 October 1950, new guidelines were set for the colleges and universities: Marxism-Leninism should be the main subject in all classes, and studying the Russian language became mandatory. By the end of 1951, 107 new course books were issued, 61 of which were translations of texts used in Soviet universities. The number of students had to be increased by an additional 30,000 over the next five years. Template:Cite journal</ref> Russian language study and Communist political instruction were made mandatory in schools and universities nationwide. Religious schools were nationalized and church leaders were replaced by those loyal to the government.<ref> Template:Cite book, Chapter 2 (The Society and Its Environment) "Religion and Religious Organizations"</ref> In 1949 the leader of the Hungarian Catholic Church, József Cardinal Mindszenty, was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment for treason.<ref> Douglas, J. D. and Philip Comfort (eds.) (1992). Who's Who in Christian History, p. 478. Tyndale House: Carol Stream, Illinois. ISBN 0-8423-1014-2</ref> Under Rákosi, Hungary's government was among the most repressive in Europe.<ref name="UNPara47"/><ref name=lawsoc/>

The postwar Hungarian economy suffered from multiple challenges. Hungary agreed to pay war reparations approximating US$300 million, to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and to support Soviet garrisons.<ref>The Avalon Project at Yale Law School: Armistice Agreement with Hungary; 20 January 1945 Retrieved 27 August 2006</ref> The Hungarian National Bank in 1946 estimated the cost of reparations as "between 19 and 22 per cent of the annual national income."<ref>Template:Cite book Retrieved 8 October 2006</ref> In 1946, the Hungarian currency experienced marked depreciation, resulting in the highest historical rates of hyperinflation known.<ref>Magyar Nemzeti Bank - English Site: History Retrieved 27 August 2006 According to Wikipedia Hyperinflation article, 4.19 × 10¹⁶ percent per month (prices doubled every 15 hours).</ref> Hungary's participation in the Soviet-sponsored COMECON (Council Of Mutual Economic Assistance), prevented it from trading with the West or receiving Marshall Plan aid.<ref>Template:Cite book Retrieved 10 October 2006</ref> Although national income per capita rose in the first third of the 1950s, the standard of living fell. Huge income deductions to finance industrial investment reduced disposable personal income; mismanagement created chronic shortages in basic foodstuffs resulting in rationing of bread, sugar, flour and meat.<ref>Template:Cite book pp. 214, 217 Template:Hu icon</ref> Compulsory subscriptions to state bonds further reduced personal income. The net result was that disposable real income of workers and employees in 1952 was only two-thirds of what it had been in 1938, whereas in 1949, the proportion had been 90 per cent.<ref name="transformation">Transformation of the Hungarian economyThe Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (2003), Accessed 27 September 2006</ref> These policies had a cumulative negative effect, and fueled discontent as foreign debt grew and the population experienced shortages of goods.<ref name="LibCongressHungaryEconomy"/>

International events

On 5 March 1953, Joseph Stalin died, ushering in a period of moderate liberalization during which most European communist parties developed a reform wing. In Hungary, the reformist Imre Nagy replaced Mátyás Rákosi, "Stalin's Best Hungarian Disciple", as Prime Minister.<ref>Template:Cite paper</ref> However, Rákosi remained General Secretary of the Party, and was able to undermine most of Nagy's reforms. By April 1955, he had Nagy discredited and removed from office.<ref>Template:Cite book (page 64)</ref> After Khrushchev's "secret speech" of February 1956, which denounced Stalin and his protégés,<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Rákosi was deposed as General Secretary of the Party and replaced by Ernő Gerő on 18 July 1956.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

On 14 May 1955, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact, binding Hungary to the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe. Among the principles of this alliance were "respect for the independence and sovereignty of states" and "noninterference in their internal affairs".<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

In 1955, the Austrian State Treaty and ensuing declaration of neutrality established Austria as a demilitarized and neutral country.<ref>Video (in German): Berichte aus Budapest: Der Ungarn Aufstand 1956 {{[2] Director: Helmut Dotterweich, (1986) - Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306-0-1:27}}</ref> This raised Hungarian hopes of also becoming neutral and in 1955 Nagy had considered "...the possibility of Hungary adopting a neutral status on the Austrian pattern".<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Austrian neutrality altered the calculus of cold war military planning as it geographically split the NATO Alliance from Geneva to Vienna, thus increasing Hungary's strategic importance to the Warsaw Pact.

In June 1956, a violent uprising by Polish workers in Poznań was put down by the government, with scores of protesters killed and wounded. Responding to popular demand, in October 1956, the government appointed the recently rehabilitated reformist communist Władysław Gomułka as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, with a mandate to negotiate trade concessions and troop reductions with the Soviet government. After a few tense days of negotiations, on 19 October the Soviets finally gave in to Gomułka's reformist demands.<ref name = satellite>Template:Cite web</ref> News of the concessions won by the Poles - known as Polish October - emboldened many Hungarians to hope for similar concessions for Hungary and these sentiments contributed significantly to the highly-charged political climate that prevailed in Hungary in the second half of October 1956.<ref name="Machcewicz">Paweł Machcewicz, 1956 - a european date</ref>

Social unrest builds

Rákosi's resignation in July 1956 emboldened students, writers and journalists to be more active and critical in politics. Students and journalists started a series of intellectual forums examining the problems facing Hungary. These forums, called Petõfi circles, became very popular and attracted thousands of participants.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> On 6 October 1956, László Rajk, who had been executed by the Rákosi government, was reburied in a moving ceremony which strengthened the party opposition,<ref>Template:Cite conference</ref> and later that month, the reformer Imre Nagy was rehabilitated to full membership in the Hungarian Working People's Party.

On 16 October 1956, university students in Szeged snubbed the official communist student union, the DISZ, by re-establishing the MEFESZ (Union of Hungarian University and Academy Students), a democratic student organization, previously banned under the Rákosi dictatorship.<ref name="Crampton295"/> Within days, the student bodies of Pécs, Miskolc, and Sopron followed suit. On 22 October, students of the Technical University compiled a list of sixteen points containing several national policy demands.<ref name=sixteen> Internet Modern History Sourcebook: Resolution by students of the Building Industry Technological University: Sixteen Political, Economic, and Ideological Points, Budapest, 22 October 1956 Retrieved 22 October 2006</ref> After the students heard that the Hungarian Writers’ Union planned on the following day to express solidarity with pro-reform movements in Poland by laying a wreath at the statue of Polish-born General Bem, a hero of Hungary's War of Independence (1848–49), the students decided to organize a parallel demonstration of sympathy.<ref name="Machcewicz"/><ref name="UN">UNITED NATIONS REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY. Page 145, para 441. Last accessed on 11 April 2007</ref>

Revolution

First shots

On the afternoon of 23 October 1956, approximately 20,000 protesters convened next to the Bem statue.<ref>Video (in Hungarian): The First Hours of the Revolution {{[3] director: György Ordódy, producer: Duna Televízió - Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306-0-1:40}}</ref> Péter Veres, President of the Writers’ Union, read a manifesto to the crowd,<ref>Hungarian Revolt, 23 October–4 November 1956 (Richard Lettis and William I. Morris, editors): Appendices Proclamation of the Hungarian Writers' Union (23 October 1956) Retrieved 8 September 2006</ref> the students read their proclamation, and the crowd then chanted the censored "National Song" (Nemzeti dal), the refrain of which states: "We vow, we vow, we will no longer remain slaves." Someone in the crowd cut out the communist coat of arms from the Hungarian flag, leaving a distinctive hole and others quickly followed suit.<ref name="Heller">Template:Cite book</ref> Afterwards, most of the crowd crossed the Danube to join demonstrators outside the Parliament Building. By 6 p.m., the multitude had swollen to more than 200,000 people;<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> the demonstration was spirited, but peaceful.<ref name="UN report 2C p55">UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

At 8 p.m., First Secretary Ernő Gerő broadcast a speech condemning the writers' and students' demands, and dismissing the demonstrators as a reactionary mob.<ref name="UN report 2C p55" /> Angered by Gerő's hard-line rejection, some demonstrators decided to carry out one of their demands - the removal of Stalin's 30ft (10 m)-high bronze statue that was erected in 1951 on the site of a church, which was demolished to make room for the Stalin monument.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> By 9:30 p.m. the statue was toppled and jubilant crowds celebrated by placing Hungarian flags in Stalin's boots, which was all that was left of the statue.<ref name="UN report 2C p55" />

At about the same time, a large crowd gathered at the Radio Budapest building, which was heavily guarded by the ÁVH. The flash point was reached as a delegation attempting to broadcast their demands was detained and the crowd grew increasingly unruly as rumors spread that the protesters had been shot. Tear gas was thrown from the upper windows and the ÁVH opened fire on the crowd, killing many.<ref name="UN report 2C p56">UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> The ÁVH tried to re-supply itself by hiding arms inside an ambulance, but the crowd detected the ruse and intercepted it. Hungarian soldiers sent to relieve the ÁVH hesitated and then, tearing the red stars from their caps, sided with the crowd.<ref name="Heller"/><ref name="UN report 2C p56" /> Provoked by the ÁVH attack, protesters reacted violently. Police cars were set ablaze, guns were seized from military depots and distributed to the masses and symbols of the communist regime were vandalised.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

Fighting spreads, government falls

During the night of 23 October, Hungarian Working People's Party Secretary Ernő Gerő requested Soviet military intervention "to suppress a demonstration that was reaching an ever greater and unprecedented scale."<ref name = satellite/> The Soviet leadership had formulated contingency plans for intervention in Hungary several months before.<ref>Template:Cite book (page 160). Gati states: "discovered in declassified documents, the Soviet Ministry of Defense had begun to prepare for large-scale turmoil in Hungary as early as July 1956. Codenamed "Wave", the plan called for restoration of order in less than six hours...the Soviet Army was ready. More than 30,000 troops were dispatched to—and 6,000 reached—Budapest by the 24th, that is, in less than a day."</ref> By 2 a.m. on 24 October, under orders of the Soviet defense minister, Soviet tanks entered Budapest.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

On 24 October, Soviet tanks were stationed outside the Parliament building and Soviet soldiers guarded key bridges and crossroads. Armed revolutionaries quickly set up barricades to defend Budapest, and were reported to have already captured some Soviet tanks by mid-morning.<ref name="Heller"/> That day, Imre Nagy replaced András Hegedűs as Prime Minister.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> On the radio, Nagy called for an end to violence and promised to initiate political reforms which had been shelved three years earlier. The population continued to arm itself as sporadic violence erupted. Armed protesters seized the radio building. At the offices of the Communist newspaper Szabad Nép unarmed demonstrators were fired upon by ÁVH guards who were then driven out as armed demonstrators arrived.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> At this point, the revolutionaries' wrath focused on the ÁVH;<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Soviet military units were not yet fully engaged, and there were many reports of some Soviet troops showing open sympathy for the demonstrators.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

On 25 October, a mass of protesters gathered in front of the Parliament Building. ÁVH units began shooting into the crowd from the rooftops of neighboring buildings.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Some Soviet soldiers returned fire on the ÁVH, mistakenly believing that they were the targets of the shooting.<ref name="Heller"/><ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Supplied by arms taken from the ÁVH or given by Hungarian soldiers who joined the uprising, some in the crowd started shooting back.<ref name="Heller"/><ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

The attacks at the Parliament forced the collapse of the government.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Communist First Secretary Ernő Gerő and former Prime Minister András Hegedűs fled to the Soviet Union; Imre Nagy became Prime Minister and János Kádár First Secretary of the Communist Party.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Revolutionaries began an aggressive offensive against Soviet troops and the remnants of the ÁVH.

As the Hungarian resistance fought Soviet tanks using Molotov cocktails in the narrow streets of Budapest, revolutionary councils arose nationwide, assumed local governmental authority, and called for general strikes. Public Communist symbols such as red stars and Soviet war memorials were removed, and Communist books were burned. Spontaneous revolutionary militias arose, such as the 400-man group loosely led by József Dudás, which attacked or murdered Soviet sympathizers and ÁVH members.<ref>Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), KGB Chief Serov's report, 29 October 1956, (by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Retrieved 8 October 2006</ref> Soviet units fought primarily in Budapest; elsewhere the countryside was largely quiet. Soviet commanders often negotiated local cease-fires with the revolutionaries.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> In some regions, Soviet forces managed to quell revolutionary activity. In Budapest, the Soviets were eventually fought to a stand-still and hostilities began to wane. Hungarian general Béla Király, freed from a life sentence for political offenses and acting with the support of the Nagy government, sought to restore order by unifying elements of the police, army and insurgent groups into a National Guard.<ref name=ng>Template:Cite book (pp. 176–177)</ref> A ceasefire was arranged on 28 October, and by 30 October most Soviet troops had withdrawn from Budapest to garrisons in the Hungarian countryside.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

Interlude

Fighting had virtually ceased between 28 October and 4 November, as many Hungarians believed that Soviet military units were indeed withdrawing from Hungary.<ref>Video: Revolt in Hungary {{[4] Narrator: Walter Cronkite, producer: CBS (1956) - Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306-0-1:40}}</ref>

The New Hungarian National Government

The rapid spread of the uprising in the streets of Budapest and the abrupt fall of the Gerő-Hegedűs government left the new national leadership surprised, and at first disorganized. Nagy, a loyal Party reformer described as possessing "only modest political skills",<ref>Template:Cite book (page 52)</ref> initially appealed to the public for calm and a return to the old order. Yet Nagy, the only remaining Hungarian leader with credibility in both the eyes of the public and the Soviets, "at long last concluded that a popular uprising rather than a counter-revolution was taking place".<ref>Template:Cite book (page 173)</ref> Calling the ongoing insurgency "a broad democratic mass movement" in a radio address on 27 October, Nagy formed a government which included some non-communist ministers. This new National Government abolished both the ÁVH and the one-party system.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Because it held office only ten days, the National Government had little chance to clarify its policies in detail. However, newspaper editorials at the time stressed that Hungary should be a neutral, multiparty social democracy.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary(1957) Template:PDF</ref> Many political prisoners were released, most notably József Cardinal Mindszenty.<ref>Video: Revolt in Hungary {{[5] Narrator: Walter Cronkite, producer: CBS (1956) - Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306-0-1:40}}</ref> Political parties which were previously banned, such as the Independent Smallholders and the National Peasants' Party, reappeared to join the coalition.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary(1957) Template:PDF</ref>

Local revolutionary councils formed throughout Hungary<ref>Video: BBC Report on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (1956) George Mikes, correspondent {{[6] Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306-0-1:1}}</ref> , generally without involvement from the preoccupied National Government in Budapest, and assumed various responsibilities of local government from the defunct communist party.<ref name=rc>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> By 30 October, these councils had been officially sanctioned by the Hungarian Working People's Party, and the Nagy government asked for their support as "autonomous, democratic local organs formed during the Revolution".<ref name=rc/> Likewise, workers' councils were established at industrial plants and mines, and many unpopular regulations such as production norms were eliminated. The workers' councils strove to manage the enterprise whilst protecting workers' interests; thus establishing a socialist economy free of rigid party control.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Local control by the councils was not always bloodless; in Debrecen, Győr, Sopron, Mosonmagyaróvár and other cities, crowds of demonstrators were fired upon by the ÁVH, with many lives lost. The ÁVH were disarmed, often by force, in many cases assisted by the local police.<ref name=rc/>

Soviet perspective

On 24 October, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the Politburo) discussed the political upheavals in Poland and Hungary. A hard-line faction led by Molotov was pushing for intervention, but Khrushchev and Marshal Zhukov were initially opposed. A delegation in Budapest reported that the situation was not as dire as had been portrayed. Khrushchev stated that he believed that Party Secretary Ernő Gerő's request for intervention on 23 October indicated that the Hungarian Party still held the confidence of the Hungarian public. In addition, he saw the protests not as an ideological struggle, but as popular discontent over unresolved basic economic and social issues.<ref name = satellite/>

After some debate,<ref name = presidium1030>Template:Cite web</ref> <ref>"When the Soviet Union nearly blinked", BBC News, 23 October 2006.</ref> the Presidium on 30 October decided not to remove the new Hungarian government. Even Marshal Georgy Zhukov said: "We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole. This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere." They adopted a Declaration of the Government of the USSR on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist States, which was issued the next day. This document proclaimed: "The Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary."<ref>Declaration of the Government of the USSR on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist States 30 October 1956, Printed in The Department of State Bulletin, XXXV, No. 907 (12 November 1956), pp. 745–747, Accessed 2006-10-19</ref> Thus for a brief moment it looked like there could be a peaceful solution.

On 30 October, armed protestors attacked the ÁVH detachment guarding the Budapest Hungarian Working People's Party headquarters on Köztársaság tér (Republic square), incited by rumors of prisoners held there, and the earlier shootings of demonstrators by the ÁVH in the city of Mosonmagyaróvár.<ref name=rc/><ref name=Kramer1>Mark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises" (PDF), Cold War International History Project Bulletin, page 368.</ref><ref name=revhu>The Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Part 3. Days of Freedom</ref> Over 20 AVH officers were killed, some of them lynched by the mob. Hungarian army tanks sent to rescue the party headquarters mistakenly bombarded the building.<ref name=revhu/> The head of the Budapest party committee, Imre Mező, was wounded and later died.<ref>Template:Cite book (page 177)</ref><ref name=parsons>Template:Cite journal</ref> Scenes from Republic Square were shown on Soviet newsreels a few hours later.<ref>William Taubman: Khrushchev. The Man and His Era (2005), ISBN 9780743275644, page 296.</ref> Revolutionary leaders in Hungary condemned the incident and appealed for calm, and the mob violence soon died down,<ref>"3. Lesson: The Days of Freedom", The Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.</ref> but images of the victims were nevertheless used as propaganda by various Communist organs.<ref name=parsons/>

On 31 October the Soviet leaders decided to reverse their decision from the previous day. There is disagreement among historians whether Hungary's declaration to exit the Warsaw Pact caused the second Soviet intervention. Minutes of the 31 October meeting of the Presidium record that the decision to intervene militarily was taken one day before Hungary declared its neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.<ref name = presidium>Template:Cite web</ref> However, some Russian historians who are not advocates of the Communist era maintain that the Hungarian declaration of neutrality caused the Kremlin to intervene a second time.<ref>Sebestyen, Victor, Ungernrevolten 1956: Tolv dagar som skakade världen (2006), p. 286. (Swedish edition of Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution), ISBN 91-518-4612-8. (Cites Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War (2004), p. 243-249.)</ref> Two days earlier, on 30 October, when Soviet Politburo representatives Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov were in Budapest, Nagy had hinted that neutrality was a long-term objective for Hungary, and that he was hoping to discuss this matter with the leaders in the Kremlin. This information was passed on to Moscow by Mikoyan and Suslov.<ref>Mark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises" (PDF), Cold War International History Project Bulletin, page 369.</ref> <ref>Sebestyen, Victor, Ungernrevolten 1956: Tolv dagar som skakade världen (2006), p. 286.</ref> At that same time, Khrushchev was in Stalin's Dacha, considering his options regarding Hungary. One of his speechwriters later said that the declaration of neutrality was an important factor in his subsequent decision to support intervention.<ref>Sebestyen, Victor, Ungernrevolten 1956: Tolv dagar som skakade världen (2006), p. 286. (Cites Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the first Russian Spring (1991), p. 88-94.)</ref> In addition, some Hungarian leaders of the revolution as well as students had called for their country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact much earlier, and this may have influenced Soviet decision making.<ref>Johanna Granville, "New Insights on the 1956 Crisis", January, 2000.</ref>

Several other key events alarmed the Presidium and cemented the interventionists' position:<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref name = presidium1nov>Cold War International History Project: Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 1 November 1956 [7], Retrieved 6 December 2008</ref>

• Simultaneous movements towards multiparty parliamentary democracy, and a democratic national council of workers, which could "lead towards a capitalist state." Both movements challenged the pre-eminence of the Soviet Communist Party in Eastern Europe and perhaps Soviet hegemony itself. For the majority of the Presidium, the workers' direct control over their councils without Communist Party leadership was incompatible with their idea of socialism. At the time, these councils were, in the words of Hannah Arendt, "the only free and acting soviets (councils) in existence anywhere in the world".<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
• The Presidium was concerned lest the West might perceive Soviet weakness if it did not deal firmly with Hungary. On 1956-10-29, Israeli, British and French forces invaded Egypt. Khrushchev reportedly remarked "We should reexamine our assessment and should not withdraw our troops from Hungary and Budapest. We should take the initiative in restoring order in Hungary. If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French--the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive... To Egypt they will then add Hungary. We have no other choice."<ref name = presidium/>
• Khrushchev stated that many in the communist party would not understand a failure to respond with force in Hungary. De-Stalinization had alienated the more conservative elements of the Party, who were alarmed at threats to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. On 17 June 1953, workers in East Berlin had staged an uprising, demanding the resignation of the government of the German Democratic Republic. This was quickly and violently put down with the help of the Soviet military, with 84 killed and wounded and 700 arrested.<ref>Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov in Berlin to N.A. Bulganin, (by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Retrieved 10 October 2006</ref> In June 1956, in Poznań, Poland, an anti-government workers' revolt had been suppressed by the Polish security forces with between 57<ref name="Paczkowski">Andrzej Paczkowski, Pół wieku dziejów Polski, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2005, ISBN 83-0114-487-4, p. 203</ref> and 78<ref name="Jastrząb">Ł. Jastrząb, "Rozstrzelano moje serce w Poznaniu. Poznański Czerwiec 1956 r. – straty osobowe i ich analiza", Wydawnictwo Comandor, Warszawa 2006</ref><ref name="Wójtowocz">Norbert Wójtowicz, Ofiary „Poznańskiego Czerwca”, Rok 1956 na Węgrzech i w Polsce. Materiały z węgiersko–polskiego seminarium. Wrocław październik 1996, ed. Łukasz Andrzej Kamiński, Wrocław 1996, p. 32–41.</ref> deaths and led to the installation of a less Soviet-controlled government. Additionally, by late October, unrest was noticed in some regional areas of the Soviet Union: while this unrest was minor, it was intolerable.
• Hungarian neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact represented a breach in the Soviet defensive buffer zone of satellite nations.<ref>Template:Cite journal by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network</ref> Soviet fear of invasion from the West made a defensive buffer of allied states in Eastern Europe an essential security objective.

The Presidium decided to break the de facto ceasefire and crush the Hungarian revolution.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> The plan was to declare a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" under János Kádár, who would appeal for Soviet assistance to restore order. According to witnesses, Kádár was in Moscow in early November,<ref>Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November, 1956, with Participation by J. Kádár, F. Münnich, and I. Horváth, (by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Retrieved 8 October 2006</ref> and he was in contact with the Soviet embassy while still a member of the Nagy government.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Delegations were sent to other Communist governments in Eastern Europe and China, seeking to avoid a regional conflict, and propaganda messages prepared for broadcast as soon as the second Soviet intervention had begun. To disguise these intentions, Soviet diplomats were to engage the Nagy government in talks discussing the withdrawal of Soviet forces.<ref name = presidium/>

According to some sources, the Chinese leader Mao Zedong played an important role in Khrushchev's decision to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Chinese Communist Party Deputy Chairman Liu Shaoqi put pressure on Khrushchev to send in troops to put down the revolt by force.<ref>Philip Short, Mao: a life (2001), page 451.</ref> <ref>John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: a new history (2005), page 109.</ref> Although the relations between China and the Soviet Union had deteriorated during the recent years, Mao's words still carried great weight in Kremlin, and they were frequently in contact during the crisis. Initially Mao opposed a second intervention and this information was passed on to Khrushchev on 30 October, before the Presidium met and decided against intervention.<ref>Sebestyen, Victor, Ungernrevolten 1956: Tolv dagar som skakade världen (2006), p. 247. ISBN 91-518-4612-8.</ref> Mao then changed his mind in favor of intervention, but according to William Taubman it remains unclear when and how Khrushchev learned of this and thus if it influenced his decision on 31 October.<ref>William Taubman: Khrushchev. The Man and His Era (2005), ISBN 9780743275644, page 297.</ref>

On 1 November to 3 November, Khrushchev left Moscow to meet with his East-European allies and inform them of the decision to intervene. At the first such meeting, he met with Władysław Gomułka in Brest. Then he had talks with the Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian leaders in Bucharest. Finally Khrushchev flew with Malenkov to Yugoslavia, where they met with Tito, who was vacationing on his island Brioni in the Adriatic. The Yugoslavs also persuaded Khrushchev to choose János Kádár instead of Ferenc Münnich as the new leader of Hungary.<ref>Mark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises" (PDF), Cold War International History Project Bulletin, pages 373-374.</ref> <ref>Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Diplomat who Defied Soviet Leaders Dies", Radio Free Europe Research, 1982-08-05.</ref>

International reaction

Although the United States Secretary of State recommended on 24 October that the United Nations Security Council convene to discuss the situation in Hungary, little immediate action was taken to introduce a resolution.<ref>Template:Cite paper</ref> Responding to the plea by Nagy at the time of the second massive Soviet intervention on 4 November, the Security Council resolution critical of Soviet actions was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The General Assembly, by a vote of 50 in favor, 8 against and 15 abstentions, called on the Soviet Union to end its Hungarian intervention, but the newly constituted Kádár government rejected UN observers.<ref>Hungarian Revolt, 23 October–4 November 1956 (Richard Lettis and William I. Morris, editors): Appendices The Hungary Question in the United Nations Retrieved 3 September 2006 </ref>

The U.S. President, Dwight Eisenhower, was aware of a detailed study of Hungarian resistance which recommended against U.S. military intervention,<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> and of earlier policy discussions within the National Security Council which focused upon encouraging discontent in Soviet satellite nations only by economic policies and political rhetoric.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> In a 1998 interview, Hungarian Ambassador Géza Jeszenszky was critical of Western inaction in 1956, citing the influence of the United Nations at that time and giving the example of UN intervention in Korea from 1950–53.<ref name=cnn>CNN: Géza Jeszenszky, Hungarian Ambassador, Cold War Chat (transcript) 8 November 1998</ref>

During the uprising, the Radio Free Europe (RFE) Hungarian-language programs broadcast news of the political and military situation, as well as appealing to Hungarians to fight the Soviet forces, including tactical advice on resistance methods. After the Soviet suppression of the revolution, RFE was criticized for having misled the Hungarian people that NATO or United Nations would intervene if the citizens continued to resist.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

Soviet intervention of 4 November

On 1 November, Imre Nagy received reports that Soviet forces had entered Hungary from the east and were moving towards Budapest.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Nagy sought and received assurances from Soviet ambassador Yuri Andropov that the Soviet Union would not invade, although Andropov knew otherwise. The Cabinet, with János Kádár in agreement, declared Hungary's neutrality, withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, and requested assistance from the diplomatic corps in Budapest and the UN Secretary-General to defend Hungary's neutrality.<ref>Imre Nagy’s Telegram to Diplomatic Missions in Budapest Declaring Hungary’s Neutrality (1 November 1956) by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network</ref> Ambassador Andropov was asked to inform his government that Hungary would begin negotiations on the removal of Soviet forces immediately.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref><ref>Template:Cite web</ref>

On 3 November, a Hungarian delegation led by the Minister of Defense Pál Maléter were invited to attend negotiations on Soviet withdrawal at the Soviet Military Command at Tököl, near Budapest. At around midnight that evening, General Ivan Serov, Chief of the Soviet Security Police (NKVD) ordered the arrest of the Hungarian delegation,<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> and the next day, the Soviet army again attacked Budapest.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

This second Soviet intervention, codenamed "Operation Whirlwind", was launched by Marshal Ivan Konev.<ref name=troops>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref><ref name = presidium1nov/> The five Soviet divisions stationed in Hungary before 23 October were augmented to a total strength of 17 divisions.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The 8th Mechanized Army under command of Lieutenant General Hamazasp Babadzhanian and the 38th Army under command of Lieutenant General Hadzhi-Umar Mamsurov from the nearby Carpathian Military District were deployed to Hungary for the operation. <ref>Template:Cite book (page 54)</ref> Some rank-and-file Soviet soldiers reportedly believed they were being sent to Berlin to fight German fascists.<ref name="Fryer">Template:Cite book</ref> By 9:30 p.m. on 3 November, the Soviet Army had completely encircled Budapest.<ref name="UN report 5C p196">UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

At 3:00 a.m. on 4 November, Soviet tanks penetrated Budapest along the Pest side of the Danube in two thrusts: one up the Soroksári road from the south and the other down the Váci road from the north. Thus before a single shot was fired, the Soviets had effectively split the city in half, controlled all bridgeheads, and were shielded to the rear by the wide Danube river. Armored units crossed into Buda and at 4:25 a.m. fired the first shots at the army barracks on Budaõrsi road. Soon after, Soviet artillery and tank fire was heard in all districts of Budapest.<ref name="UN report 5C p196" /> Operation Whirlwind combined air strikes, artillery, and the coordinated tank-infantry action of 17 divisions.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> The Hungarian Army put up sporadic and uncoordinated resistance. Although some very senior officers were openly pro-Soviet, the rank and file soldiers were overwhelmingly loyal to the revolution and either fought against the invasion or deserted. The United Nations reported that there were no recorded incidents of Hungarian Army units fighting on the side of the Soviets.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

At 5:20 a.m. on 4 November, Imre Nagy broadcast his final plea to the nation and the world, announcing that Soviet Forces were attacking Budapest and that the Government remained at its post.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> The radio station, Free Kossuth Rádió, stopped broadcasting at 8:07 a.m.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> An emergency Cabinet meeting was held in the Parliament building, but was attended by only three Ministers. As Soviet troops arrived to occupy the building, a negotiated evacuation ensued, leaving Minister of State István Bibó as the last representative of the National Government remaining at post.<ref name="Bibo">Template:Cite book</ref> Awaiting arrest, he wrote For Freedom and Truth, a stirring proclamation to the nation and the world.

At 6:00 am on 4 November,<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> in the town of Szolnok, János Kádár proclaimed the "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government". His statement declared "We must put an end to the excesses of the counter-revolutionary elements. The hour for action has sounded. We are going to defend the interest of the workers and peasants and the achievements of the people's democracy."<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Later that evening, Kádár called upon "the faithful fighters of the true cause of socialism" to come out of hiding and take up arms. However, Hungarian support did not materialize; the fighting did not take on the character of an internally divisive civil war, but rather, in the words of a United Nations report, that of "a well-equipped foreign army crushing by overwhelming force a national movement and eliminating the Government."<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

By 8:00 am organised defence of the city evaporated after the radio station was seized, and many defenders fell back to fortified positions.<ref name="UN report 5C p197">UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> Hungarian civilians bore the brunt of the fighting, as Soviet troops spared little effort to differentiate military from civilian targets.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> For this reason, Soviet tanks often crept along main roads firing indiscriminately into buildings.<ref name="UN report 5C p197" /> Hungarian resistance was strongest in the industrial areas of Budapest, which were heavily targeted by Soviet artillery and air strikes.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> The last pocket of resistance called for ceasefire on 10 November. Over 2,500 Hungarians and 722 Soviet troops had been killed and thousands more were wounded.<ref>Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.33, No.2, April 1998, p.210.</ref><ref>Péter Gosztonyi, "Az 1956-os forradalom számokban", Népszabadság (Budapest), 3 November 1990.</ref>

Soviet version of the events

Soviet reports of the events surrounding, during, and after were remarkably consistent in their accounts, more so after the Second Soviet intervention cemented support for the Soviet position amongst international Communist Parties. Pravda published an account 36 hours after the outbreak of violence, which set the tone for all further reports and subsequent Soviet historiography:

1. On 23 October, the "honest" socialist Hungarians demonstrated against mistakes made by the Rákosi and Gerő governments.
2. Fascist, Hitlerite, reactionary, counter-revolutionary hooligans financed by the imperialist west took advantage of the unrest to stage a counter-revolution.
3. The honest Hungarian people under Nagy appealed to Soviet (Warsaw Pact) forces stationed in Hungary to assist in restoring order.
4. The Nagy government was ineffective, allowing itself to be penetrated by counter-revolutionary influences, weakening then disintegrating, as proven by Nagy's culminating denouncement of the Warsaw Pact.
5. Hungarian patriots under Kádár broke with the Nagy government and formed a government of honest Hungarian revolutionary workers and peasants; this genuinely popular government petitioned the Soviet command to help put down the counter-revolution.
6. The Hungarian patriots, with Soviet assistance, smashed the counter-revolution.

The first Soviet report came out 24 hours after the first Western report. Nagy's appeal to the United Nations was not reported. After Nagy was arrested outside of the Yugoslav embassy, his arrest was not reported. Nor did accounts explain how Nagy went from patriot to traitor.<ref>Pravda (Moscow), 4 November [227/228] : "WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST DELAY"
MOSCOW
Imre Nagy turned out to be, objectively speaking, an accomplice of the reactionary forces. Imre Nagy cannot and does not want to fight the dark forces of reaction ... The Soviet Government, seeing that the presence of Soviet troops in Budapest might lead to further aggravation of the situation, ordered troops to leave Budapest, but ensuing events have shown that reactionary forces, taking advantage of the non-intervention of the Nagy Cabinet, have gone still further... The task of barring the way to reaction in Hungary has to be carried out without the slightest delay -such is the course dictated by events...
http://www.hungarian-history.hu/lib/revolt/rev16.htm, retrieved 8 October 2007</ref> The Soviet press reported calm in Budapest while the Western press reported a revolutionary crisis was breaking out. According to the Soviet account, Hungarians never wanted a revolution at all.<ref>Barghoorn, Frederick. Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton University Press. 1964.</ref>

In January 1957, representatives of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania met in Budapest to review internal developments in Hungary since the establishment of the Soviet-imposed government. A communiqué on the meeting "unanimously concluded" that Hungarian workers, with the leadership of the Kádár government and support of the Soviet army, defeated attempts "to eliminate the socialist achievements of the Hungarian people".<ref name=communique>George Washington University: The National Security Archive, Communiqué on the Meeting of Representatives of the Governments and the Communist and Workers’ Parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union (Budapest, January 6, 1957), retrieved 7 December 2008.</ref>

Soviet, Chinese and other Warsaw Pact governments urged Kádár to proceed with interrogation and trial of former Nagy government ministers, and asked for punitive measures against the“counter-revolutionists”.<ref name=communique/><ref>George Washington University: The National Security Archive, Minutes of the Meeting between the Hungarian and Chinese Delegations in Budapest on 16 January 1957, retrieved 7 December 2008</ref> In addition the Kádár government published an extensive series of white books (The Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary) documenting real incidents of violence against Communist Party and AVH members, and the real confessions of Nagy supporters. These white books were widely distributed in several languages in most of the socialist countries and, while based in fact, present factual evidence with a colouring and narrative not generally supported by non-Soviet aligned historians.<ref> The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents by Csaba Békés & Malcolm Byrne (Published by Central European University Press, 2002, isbn 9639241660, 9789639241664, 598 pages), p. 375, para 4: "...the (Kádár) regime had to find an explanation for the revolution and collapse of the old regime in October 1956...they chose to interpret the uprising as a conspiracy by anti-communist, reactionary forces. This is why they labeled many ordinary citizens' actions as crimes. Critical opposition attitudes were described as "a plot to overthrow the people's democratic regime," and workers and peasants who took part in the revolt were called "jailbirds, ragamuffins, and kulaks." Armed resistance to occupying forces became "murder and wrecking state property." This kind of terminology became part of the official ideology of the regime toward the outside world." Also p. 375, footnote 40: "For a typical survey of propaganda intended for distribution abroad, see the so called "White Books" entitled The Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary, 4 vols., (Budapest: Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, 1956-1957)...The White Books published in the individual counties of Hungary in 1957-1958 summarized local "counter-revolutionary" events."</ref>

Aftermath

Hungary

Between 10 November and 19 December, workers' councils negotiated directly with the occupying Soviets. While they achieved some prisoner releases, they did not achieve a Soviet withdrawal. Thousands of Hungarians were arrested, imprisoned and deported to the Soviet Union, many without evidence.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> Approximately 200,000 Hungarians fled Hungary,<ref name="Cseresneyes">Template:Cite journal</ref> some 26,000 were put on trial by the Kádár government, and of those 13,000 were imprisoned.<ref>Template:Cite conference</ref> Former Hungarian Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky estimated 350 were executed.<ref name=cnn/> Sporadic armed resistance and strikes by workers' councils continued until mid-1957, causing substantial economic disruption.

With most of Budapest under Soviet control by 8 November, Kádár became Prime Minister of the "Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government" and General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Few Hungarians rejoined the reorganized Party, its leadership having been purged under the supervision of the Soviet Presidium, led by Georgy Malenkov and Mikhail Suslov.<ref name = situation>Template:Cite web</ref> Although Party membership declined from 800,000 before the uprising to 100,000 by December 1956, Kádár steadily increased his control over Hungary and neutralized dissenters. The new government attempted to enlist support by espousing popular principles of Hungarian self-determination voiced during the uprising, but Soviet troops remained.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> After 1956 the Soviet Union severely purged the Hungarian Army and reinstituted political indoctrination in the units that remained. In May 1957, the Soviet Union increased its troop levels in Hungary and by treaty Hungary accepted the Soviet presence on a permanent basis.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref>

The Red Cross and the Austrian Army established refugee camps in Traiskirchen and Graz.<ref name="Cseresneyes"/><ref>International Committee of the Red Cross: ICRC action in Hungary in 1956, retrieved 7 December 2008.</ref> Imre Nagy along with Georg Lukács, Géza Losonczy, and László Rajk's widow, Júlia, took refuge in the Embassy of Yugoslavia as Soviet forces overran Budapest. Despite assurances of safe passage out of Hungary by the Soviets and the Kádár government, Nagy and his group were arrested when attempting to leave the embassy on 22 November and taken to Romania. Losonczy died while on a hunger strike in prison awaiting trial when his jailers "carelessly pushed a feeding tube down his windpipe."<ref>Fryer, Peter (1997). Hungarian Tragedy, p. 10. Index Books: London. ISBN 1-871518-14-8.</ref> The remainder of the group was returned to Budapest in 1958. Nagy was executed, along with Pál Maléter and Miklós Gimes, after secret trials in June 1958. Their bodies were placed in unmarked graves in the Municipal Cemetery outside Budapest.<ref name="BBCJune16">"On This Day 16 June 1989: Hungary reburies fallen hero Imre Nagy" British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reports on Nagy reburial with full honors. (Accessed 13 October 2006)</ref>

By 1963, most political prisoners from the 1956 Hungarian revolution had been released.<ref>Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer (2002). Hungarian Tragedy, p. L. Central European University Press: Budapest. ISBN 963-9241-66-0.</ref> During the November 1956 Soviet assault on Budapest, Cardinal Mindszenty was granted political asylum at the United States embassy, where he lived for the next 15 years, refusing to leave Hungary unless the government reversed his 1949 conviction for treason. Due to poor health and a request from the Vatican, he finally left the embassy for Austria in September 1971.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

International

Despite Cold War rhetoric by the West espousing a rollback of the domination of Eastern Europe by the USSR, and Soviet promises of the imminent triumph of socialism, national leaders of this period as well as later historians saw the failure of the uprising in Hungary as evidence that the Cold War in Europe had become a stalemate.<ref>Johns Hopkins University Professor Charles Gati, in his book Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (see Further reading, below), agreed with a 2002 essay by Hungarian historian Csaba Bekes "Could the Hungarian Revolution Have Been Victorious in 1956?". Gati states: "Washington implicitly acknowledging the division of the continent into two camps, understood that Moscow would not let go of a country bordering on neutral but pro-Western Austria and an independent Yugoslavia, so it shed ...tears over Soviet brutality, and exploited the propaganda opportunities..." (p. 208)</ref> The Foreign Minister of West Germany recommended that the people of Eastern Europe be discouraged from "taking dramatic action which might have disastrous consequences for themselves." The Secretary-General of NATO called the Hungarian revolt "the collective suicide of a whole people".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In a newspaper interview in 1957, Khrushchev commented "support by United States ... is rather in the nature of the support that the rope gives to a hanged man."<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Twelve years later, when Soviet-led forces ended a similar movement toward liberalization in Czechoslovakia, First Secretary Alexander Dubček, recalling the Hungarian experience, asked his citizens not to resist the occupation.

In January 1957, United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, acting in response to UN General Assembly resolutions requesting investigation and observation of the events in Soviet-occupied Hungary, established the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary.<ref>Template:Cite paper</ref> The Committee, with representatives from Australia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, conducted hearings in New York, Geneva, Rome, Vienna and London. Over five months, 111 refugees were interviewed including ministers, military commanders and other officials of the Nagy government, workers, revolutionary council members, factory managers and technicians, communists and non-communists, students, writers, teachers, medical personnel and Hungarian soldiers. Documents, newspapers, radio transcripts, photos, film footage and other records from Hungary were also reviewed, as well as written testimony of 200 other Hungarians.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> The governments of Hungary and Romania refused the UN officials of the Committee entry, and the government of the Soviet Union did not respond to requests for information.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> The 268-page Committee Report<ref>UN General Assembly (1957) Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary Accessed 14 October 2006</ref> was presented to the General Assembly in June 1957, documenting the course of the uprising and Soviet intervention, and concluding that the Kádár government and Soviet occupation were in violation of the human rights of the Hungarian people.<ref>UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) Template:PDF</ref> A General Assembly resolution was approved, deploring the repression of the Hungarian people and the Soviet occupation, but no other action was taken.<ref>United Nations General Assembly, Thirteenth Session: Resolution 1312 (XIII) The Situation in Hungary (Item 59, p. 69 (12 December 1958)</ref>

Time magazine named the Hungarian Freedom Fighter its Man of the Year for 1956. The accompanying Time article comments that this choice could not have been anticipated until the explosive events of the revolution, almost at the end of 1956. The magazine cover and accompanying text displayed an artist's depiction of a Hungarian freedom fighter, and used pseudonyms for the three participants whose stories are the subject of the article.<ref>Template:Citation, retrieved 2008-09-21</ref> Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány referred to this famous Time Man of the Year cover as "the faces of free Hungary" in a speech to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1956 uprising.<ref>Formal Address of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in the Hungarian Parliament (23 October 2006), retrieved 2008-09-21</ref> Prime Minister Gyurcsány, in a joint appearance with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, commented specifically on the TIME cover itself, that "It is an idealised image but the faces of the figures are really the face of the revolutionaries"<ref>Statement with the Hungarian Prime Minister (11 October 2006) retrieved 2008-09-22</ref>

At the Melbourne Olympics in 1956, the Soviet handling of the Hungarian uprising led to a boycott by Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland.<ref>International Olympic Committee: Melbourne/Stockholm 1956 Did you know? Retrieved 13 October 2006</ref> At the Olympic Village, the Hungarian delegation tore down the Communist Hungarian flag and raised the flag of Free Hungary in its place. A confrontation between Soviet and Hungarian teams occurred in the semi-final match of the water polo tournament. The match was extremely violent, and was halted in the final minute to quell fighting amongst spectators. This match, now known as the "blood in the water match", became the subject of several films.<ref>Radio Free Europe: Hungary: New Film Revisits 1956 Water-Polo Showdown Retrieved 13 October 2006</ref><ref>Szabadság, szerelem (Children of Glory)</ref> The Hungarian team won the game 4-0 and later was awarded the Olympic gold medal. Several members of the Hungarian Olympic delegation defected after the games.

The events in Hungary produced ideological fractures within the Communist parties of Western Europe. Within the Italian Communist Party (PCI) a split ensued: most ordinary members and the Party leadership, including Palmiro Togliatti and Giorgio Napolitano, regarded the Hungarian insurgents as counter-revolutionaries, as reported in l'Unità, the official PCI newspaper.<ref>The following are references in English on the conflicting positions of l'Unità, Napolitano, Antonio Giolitti and party boss Palmiro Togliatti, Giuseppe Di Vittorio and Pietro Nenni.</ref> However Giuseppe Di Vittorio, chief of the Communist trade union CGIL, repudiated the leadership position, as did the prominent party members Antonio Giolitti, Loris Fortuna and many other influential Communist intellectuals, who later were expelled or left the party. Pietro Nenni, the national secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, a close ally of the PCI, opposed the Soviet intervention as well. Napolitano, elected in 2006 as President of the Italian Republic, wrote in his 2005 political autobiography that he regretted his justification of Soviet action in Hungary, and that at the time he believed in Party unity and the international leadership of Soviet communism.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Within the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), dissent that began with the repudiation of Stalinism by John Saville and E.P. Thompson, influential historians and members of the Communist Party Historians Group, culminated in a loss of thousands of party members as events unfolded in Hungary. Peter Fryer, correspondent for the CPGB newspaper The Daily Worker, reported accurately on the violent suppression of the uprising, but his dispatches were heavily censored;<ref name="Fryer"/> Fryer resigned from the paper upon his return, and was later expelled from the communist party. In France, moderate communists, such as historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, resigned, questioning the policy of supporting Soviet actions by the French Communist Party. The French philosopher and writer Albert Camus wrote an open letter, The Blood of the Hungarians, criticizing the West's lack of action. Even Jean-Paul Sartre, still a determined communist, criticised the Soviets in his article Le Fantôme de Staline, in Situations VII.<ref>Sartre, Jean-Paul (1956), L’intellectuel et les communistes français Template:Fr icon Le Web de l'Humanite, 21 June 2005, Accessed 2006-10-24</ref>

Commemoration

In December, 1991, the preamble of the treaties with the dismembered Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, and Russia, represented by Boris Yeltsin, apologized officially for the 1956 Soviet actions in Hungary. This apology was repeated by Yeltsin in 1992 during a speech to the Hungarian parliament.<ref name = cnn/>

On 13 February 2006, the US State Department commemorated the Fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. US Secretary of State Rice commented on the contributions made by 1956 Hungarian refugees to the United States and other host countries, as well as the role of Hungary in providing refuge to East Germans during the 1989 protests against communist rule.<ref>Template:Cite press release</ref> US President George W. Bush also visited Hungary on 22 June 2006, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary.<ref>Template:Cite press release</ref>

After the fall of the communist regime, Imre Nagy's body was reburied with full honors.<ref name="BBCJune16"/> The Republic of Hungary was declared in 1989 on the 33rd anniversary of the Revolution, and 23 October is now a Hungarian national holiday. Template:Clr

See also

• Western betrayal

References

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Further reading

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• United Nations: Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, General Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3592), New York, 1957 Template:PDF
• Ürményházi, Attila J.(2006) "The Hungarian Revolution-Uprising, Budapest 1956", National Library of Australia ISBN 0-646-45885-X, Record Id: 40312920
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External links

Historical collections

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• 1956 Hungarian Revolution Collection of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project (Virtual Archive 2.0), containing documents and other source materials relating to the 1956 Revolution.
• 1956 newspaper front pages Historic front pages from Hungarian newspapers, June to December 1956.
• Hungary '56 Andy Anderson's pamphlet, written in 1964 and originally published by Solidarity (UK), about events of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, focusing on Hungarian demands for economic and political self-management. (AK Press 2002, ISBN 0-934868-01-8)
• The Hungarian Revolt, 23 October–4 November 1956 A Scribner research anthology of written sources on the Hungarian Revolt, edited by Richard Lettis and William I. Morris. Documents include radio broadcasts, newspaper and magazine articles, and portions of books on the revolt.
• Hungarian Tragedy An eyewitness account by Peter Fryer, correspondent for the British Communist Party's newspaper, The Daily Worker.
• Institute of Revolutionary History, Hungary A Hungarian language site providing historical photos and documents, books and reviews, and links to English language sites.
• OSA Digital Archive Videos of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
• Polish Hungarian conections in 1956 - "Common Roads to Freedom"
• RADIO FREE EUROPE Research, RAD Background Report/29: (Hungary) 20 October 1981, A CHRONOLOGY OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION, 23-4 October November 1956, compiled by RAD/Hungarian Section-Published accounts
• Universal Pictures and Warner Pathé newsreels regarding the revolution
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• A risen people – against Stalinism, for workers’ democracy by Norma Prendiville, Militant Irish Monthly (December 1986). Account of the uprising emphasizing its socialist roots and the workers' councils.
• "On this day 4 November 1956: Soviet troops overrun Hungary" (Accessed 12 October 2006) - British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reports on the first day of the second Soviet intervention and the fall of the Nagy government.
• 1956 - The Hungarian Revolution Published in the 1980s as No.1 in a series of Council Communist pamphlets, emphasizing the events of 1956 as a Hungarian workers' uprising.
• "Notes from Snagov" – by Nagy Imre- Excerpts. In Snagov (near Bucharest, Romania) there exists a statue/monument erected in Nagy Imre's memory.
• Czechoslovakian 1956 About Czechoslovaks and Hungarians in 1956

Film

• Freedom's Fury The 2005 documentary film depicting events surrounding the Hungarian-Soviet confrontation in the Olympic water polo tournament, now known as the "blood in the water match". Narrated by Mark Spitz, produced by Lucy Liu and Quentin Tarantino.
• Szabadság, szerelem (Children of Glory) A 2006 semi-fictional film by Hungarian director Kriszta Goda, depicting the effect of the 1956 Revolution on members of the 1956 Hungarian Olympic water polo team. A few weeks after Revolution was crushed, the Hungarian players find themselves up against the Soviet Union at a semifinal match.

Commemorations

• 1956 and Hungary: The Memory of Eyewitnesses - In Search of Freedom and Democracy The website of the international conference (28 September–29 September 2006) to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The conference will review the events of the 1950s era, based on the personal experience of those who left Hungary after the revolution, who found a new home in other countries, and have contributed to their development.
• The 1956 Portal A resource for Hungarian-American organizations to highlight and promote their 1956 Hungarian Revolution commemoration activities, including 1956 photos, videos, resources, and events across the US.
• Project 56 A multimedia project for the celebration of Hungarian life & culture with a focus on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its aftermath.
• CHR50 Festival of Freedom The Cleveland Hungarian Revolution 50th Anniversary Committee website describing planned events on 21 October and 22 October 2006 in Cleveland, Ohio, a city with many citizens of Hungarian heritage.
• Freedom Fighter 56 Personal stories of survival and escape from participants in the events of 1956.
• 1956 Hungarian Memorial Oral History Project. Multicultural Canada oral history collection of 1956 Hungarian Revolution refugees in Canada.

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